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Articles and Speeches
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AFTER
McCUTCHEON V. FEC
James Bopp, Jr., Randy Elf, and Anita Y. Milanovich*
I. INTRODUCTION
With McCutcheon v. FEC having struck down particular contribution
limits, this Article addresses two issues.1
Part II addresses the
constitutionality of limits on contributions for independent spending for
political speech, which Buckley v. Valeo calls “independent
contributions[,]” while Part III addresses what Buckley calls “direct[]”
contributions to candidates.2 Each presents important issues under the
Constitution.
II. LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS FOR INDEPENDENT SPENDING
A. Quid Pro Quo Corruption or its Appearance
Applying the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
has long recognized that the only interest which suffices to ban, or
otherwise limit, political speech is the prevention of corruption of

*
James Bopp, Jr., has a national federal and state election law practice. He is General
Counsel for the James Madison Center for Free Speech, former Co-Chairman of the Free
Speech and Election Law practice group of the Federalist Society, and special counsel to the
Republican National Committee. Mr. Bopp was lead counsel for plaintiffs Shaun
McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee in the McCutcheon case that is the
subject of this Article. Randy Elf, who contributed to Part II to this Article, has been a
teacher, an assistant to authors and lecturers Russell Kirk and Annette Kirk, a newspaper
reporter, a law clerk to two federal judges, and a lawyer, and lives in Jamestown, New
York. Anita Y. Milanovich is an associate at The Bopp Law Firm and graduated from
Valparaiso University Law School. She assisted Mr. Bopp with Part III of this Article. For
more pieces from the symposium, see Valparaiso University Law School Symposium: Money in
Politics: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. (2015).
1
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–42, 1461–62 (2014).
2
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23–24 n.24, 61, 82 n.109 (1976).
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candidates or officeholders, or the appearance of corruption.3 Citizens
United v. FEC reaffirms this by addressing a ban on spending for political
speech and holding “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”4
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett (AFEC) further
reaffirms this and holds that when spending for political speech is
AFEC
independent, the “candidate-funding circuit is broken.”5
understates its point here: when such spending is independent, there is no
corrupting link to candidates or officeholders.6 It is not that the
corrupting link is “broken”—it just is not there.7
Independent expenditures—i.e., noncoordinated Buckley v. Valeo
express advocacy—are the highest grade of independent spending for
political speech.8 So when a person’s independent expenditures “do not
give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption[,]” no
independent spending for political speech by the same person “give[s]
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”9 Thus, a person who
has a First Amendment right to engage in independent expenditures has
a First Amendment right to engage in any independent spending for
political speech.
Furthermore, when “Buckley identified a . . . government[] interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was
limited to quid pro quo corruption.”10 Influence, access, favoritism, and
gratitude/ingratiation are not quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.11

3
As opposed to regulate, by requiring disclosure. Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d
1075, 1082 n.9 (D. Haw. 2010), appeal dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011); FEC v.
Nat’l Conservative PAC (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985) (citing Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45); see Citizens
Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 297 (referring to candidates and officeholders).
4
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
5
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett (AFEC), 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826–27
(2011) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357, 360).
6
See id. (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its
appearance).
7
Id. at 2826. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–61 (holding that independent
spending does not cause corruption or its appearance).
8
“Independent expenditure” means Buckley v. Valeo express advocacy that is not
coordinated with a candidate. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52, 46–47, 78, 80 (1976).
Thus, noncoordinated spending for political speech that is not Buckley express advocacy is
independent spending but not an independent expenditure. See id. at 44 & n.52, 80 (defining
express advocacy and thereby independent expenditure).
9
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (quoted in AFEC, 131 S. Ct. at 2826).
10
Id. at 359 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296–98 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)); FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (“The hallmark of
corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.”).
11
Citizens United, 558 U.S at 359–60.
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Transparency does not suffice, nor is what “the public may believe” the
quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance yardstick.12
These Citizens United holdings are binding, even if lower courts
disagree with them.13 Those who believe independent spending for
political speech causes quid pro quo corruption or its appearance must
also believe, contrary to Citizens United and AFEC, that government may
ban, or otherwise limit, such spending to prevent quid pro quo corruption
or its appearance.14 “Hence their objection is not [just] to Citizens United
but to constitutional protection of advocacy-funding practices that are as
old as the Republic.”15
B. McCutcheon Raises the Bar
Any doubt that these principles apply not just to spending for
political speech but also to contributions is gone after McCutcheon, under
which government may ban, or otherwise limit, contributions or spending
only to prevent “‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance[,]” with quid
pro quo corruption now meaning only “a direct exchange of an official act
for money.”16 No “other objectives” suffice.17 Courts “drawing” this
“line” “err on the side of protecting political speech[.]”18
Ala. Democratic Conference v. Broussard, 541 F. App’x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2013)
(unpublished). Contra id. at 935. Public-opinion polls do not determine constitutional law.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 176 (1803); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 254 (1991) (quoting Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1270 (W.D. Okla. 1972));
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (stating
that “public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge’s role because the judge is often
called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment” and that because the
“[f]ramers of the Constitution had a similar understanding of the judicial role, . . . they
established that Article III judges would be appointed, rather than elected, and would be
sheltered from public opinion by receiving life tenure and salary protection”).
If public-opinion polls determined constitutional law—as Stop this Insanity, Inc.
Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC asserts—the Brown v. Board of Education plaintiffs would
have lost. Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 44
n.24 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund
v. FEC, 761 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954).
13
See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307, 1308 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (holding that “lower courts are bound to follow” Citizens United).
14
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–61; AFEC, 131 S. Ct. at 2826–27.
15
George Will, Montana Attempts to Buck the Supreme Court on Citizens United, WASH.
POST (May 30, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/montana-attempts-tobuck-the-supreme-court-on-citizens-united/2012/05/30/gJQA4DCi2U_story.html?wprss=
rss_george-will, archived at http://perma.cc/8VYA-7XZQ.
16
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
359; citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)). This is “an effort to
12
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No “conjecture”—including about “recontributed funds” or
To
limit
contributions
“rerouted
to
candidates”—suffices.19
contributions, government must show they are in turn “used for”
contributions, i.e., “are directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.”20
When government shows no such McCutcheon “exchange” or its
“appearance[,]” much less any exchange or its appearance involving
“large” or “massive” contributions to candidates, contribution limits are
unconstitutional, at least as applied, regardless of whether strict scrutiny
or closely-drawn exacting scrutiny applies, although strict scrutiny is
preferable.21
control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties”—i.e., “an act akin to bribery.” Id. at
1450; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Although government may “limit ‘the appearance
of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a
regime of large . . . financial contributions’ to particular candidates . . . [g]overnment’s
interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the appearance of
quid pro quo corruption[.]” Id. at 1450–51 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)).
17
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citing AFEC, 131 S. Ct. at 2826).
18
Id. at 1451 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL-II), 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007)).
19
Id. at 1452, 1457 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000)).
20
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 2013) (“limits on
contributions to political committees that are to be used for independent expenditures”
(emphasis added)), id. at 1092 (“the court concluded, as has nearly every circuit court since
Citizens United, there could be no anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to be
used for such expenditures” (emphasis added)); id. at 1093 n.2 (“limits on contributions to
PACs for the purpose of making independent expenditures are unconstitutional even
under a lower level of scrutiny”); id. at 1096 (“limits on contributions for the purpose of
making independent expenditures promote no anti-corruption interest”); id. at 1103
(holding law “unconstitutional as applied to contributions to those organizations to be
used solely for independent expenditures”). McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (quoting
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 310 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
21
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441, 1450–53 (citations omitted); see id. at 1445–46 (holding
that the plaintiffs prevail either way). Under strict scrutiny, a court first asks whether there
is a compelling government interest in regulating the speech, and only if there is does a
court ask whether the law is “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL-II, 551 U.S.
at 464 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)) (quoted in
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)).
Meanwhile, “closely[-]drawn” exacting scrutiny is different. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at
387–88 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16, 25 (1976)). A court first asks whether there
is a “sufficiently important” government interest in regulating the speech, and only if there
is does a court ask whether the law is “closely drawn” to achieve that interest. FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colo. Republican-II), 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001) (quoting
Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 387–88). McCutcheon puts teeth into the phrase “closely drawn[.]”
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456. The Court states:
In the First Amendment context, fit matters. Even when the Court is
not applying strict scrutiny, we still require “a fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest
served,’ . . . that employs not necessarily the least restrictive
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C. The Next Questions
Except for foreign nationals, the Supreme Court has held that
government may not limit independent spending for political speech,
including independent expenditures properly understood.22 The next
questions are: (1) What does this mean for contributions received by
organizations engaging in only independent spending for political
speech?;23 (2) What does this mean for contributions received by
organizations for independent spending when they both make
contributions and engage in independent spending?;24 and (3) May
government ever limit contributions for independent spending for
political speech? If so, when?
The short answer is that regardless of the scrutiny level, the principle
that independent spending for political speech does not “give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption” applies when organizations

means . . . but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.” Here, because the statute is poorly tailored to the
[g]overnment’s interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits,
it impermissibly restricts participation in the political process.
Id. at 1456–57 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))
(citations omitted).
Regardless of the scrutiny level, government must prove political-speech law survives
scrutiny. WRTL-II, 551 U.S. at 464 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786); Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at
387–88 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25) (applying closely-drawn exacting scrutiny); see also
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (discussing government’s burden to prove speech law
survives scrutiny). When government seeks to ban, or otherwise limit speech, government
must prove quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232
(highlighting government’s burden to prove corruption or its appearance); see also
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462–65 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing contributions and
spending).
22
Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286–89 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d without op., Bluman v.
FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). A Supreme Court affirmance without an opinion, of a threejudge district court judgment, affirms the judgment, not the reasoning. Fusari v. Steinberg,
419 U.S. 379, 391 & n.* (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring), adopted in Mandel v. Bradley, 432
U.S. 173, 176 (1977). E.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336–66 (holding that government may
not limit independent spending for political speech); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240–46
(2006) (holding that government may not limit independent spending for political speech);
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colo. Republican-I), 518 U.S. 604, 613–20
(1996) (holding that government may not limit independent spending for political speech);
FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496–501 (1985) (holding that government may not limit
independent spending for political speech); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–51 (holding that
government may not limit independent spending for political speech).
23
Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (D. Haw. 2010), appeal dismissed,
No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011).
24
Cf. id. (addressing contributions received by organizations engaging in only
independent spending).
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engage in only independent spending.25 This principle also applies
when organizations both make contributions and engage in independent
spending.26 Before Citizens United, and particularly after Citizens United,
limits on contributions for independent spending are unconstitutional
when contributors are not foreign nationals.27 McCutcheon’s dictum
regarding transfers “among candidates and political committees” does
not support limiting contributions for independent spending, and
extends beyond transfers and contributions used for independent
spending.28
Notwithstanding Second Circuit holdings, government may prevent
“circumvention” but not with otherwise unconstitutional law.29
25
See Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1093 n.2 (holding that the plaintiffs prevail
regardless of the scrutiny level); Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664
F.3d 139, 154 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff prevails regardless of the scrutiny
level); Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1082–84 (holding that the plaintiffs prevail regardless of
the scrutiny level). Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC incorrectly
implies that the scrutiny level affects the result. See 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38–39 n.18 (D.D.C.
2012) (stating pre-McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445–46, that because “any political contribution
enjoys . . . lesser . . . First Amendment protection than any . . . political expenditure, . . .
Buckley . . . was ultimately untroubled by limits on political contributions because the
overall effect of contribution limits ‘is merely to require candidates and political
committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons’”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
357 (quoted in AFEC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011)) (holding that independent
spending does not cause corruption or its appearance). See, e.g., Republican Party of N.M.,
741 F.3d at 1095–97 (holding that independent spending does not cause corruption or its
appearance); Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 151–55 (holding that independent spending does not
cause corruption or its appearance); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of
Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 695 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (“Supreme
Court precedent forecloses the . . . argument that independent expenditures by
independent[-]expenditure committees . . . raise the specter of corruption or the appearance
thereof.”); Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (holding that independent spending does not
cause corruption or its appearance).
26
See, e.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097 (explaining that government may
limit contributions that are, in turn, used for contributions yet not contributions that are, in
turn, used for independent spending); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(explaining that government may limit contributions that are, in turn, used for
contributions yet not contributions that are, in turn, used for independent spending).
27
See Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 9–12 (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent
spending pre-Citizens United); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL-III), 525 F.3d 274, 29195 (4th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending pre-Citizens
United); see also Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1093 n.2, 1095–97 (rejecting a limit on
contributions for independent spending post-Citizens United); Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 151–55
(rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending post-Citizens United); Yamada,
744 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–84 (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending
post-Citizens United); Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285–89 (upholding a ban on contributions
and independent expenditures by foreign nationals).
28
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1458–59 (2014).
29
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60; see Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d
118, 140 n.20 (2d Cir. 2014) (VRLC-II), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015) (citing Ognibene v.
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Preventing “circumvention” cannot justify otherwise unconstitutional
law.30 This is because “there can be no freestanding anti-circumvention
interest.”31 In other words, “anti-circumvention is not an independent
state interest.”32 This applies to contribution limits and beyond.33 The
fact that “speakers find ways to circumvent campaign[-]finance laws”
does not mean preventing circumvention can justify unconstitutional
law.34 Otherwise, government could justify limits on contributions to
one’s own campaign, banning contributions by minors, unconstitutional
Randall v. Sorrell-like limits, or aggregate contribution limits by somehow
preventing “circumvention” of the same or other limits.35 This is

Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2012)) (holding that contribution limits “could be
justified as preventing circumvention of contribution limits”).
30
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60.
31
Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1102.
32
Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 548 U.S. 230,
246–62 (2006) (Walker, J., dissenting) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 161 (2003)).
Even pre-McCutcheon Supreme Court opinions rely on an “anti-circumvention”
rationale to uphold contribution limits only when they are “otherwise valid[.]” McConnell,
540 U.S. at 138 n.40, 185 (citing FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161–62 (2003)) (referring to
“circumvention of otherwise [valid] contribution limits”); see id. at 205 (referring to
“circumvention of valid contribution limits” (brackets omitted)) (quoting Beaumont, 539
U.S. at 155, quoting, in turn, FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,
456 n.18 (2001)); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 259 (2006) (quoting Colo. Republican-II, 533
U.S. at 453); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126, 129, 134, 137, 139, 144, 145, 163, 165, 170, 171–72,
174, 176 (quoting Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 453, 456); Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 160 & n.7;
Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 446, 453, 455, 457 & n.19, 460 & n.23, 461, 464 & n.28 (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 197–98 & n.18
(1981).
They are otherwise valid only if they prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance,
with quid pro quo corruption now defined as “a direct exchange of an official act for
money.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359
(2010)). See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 736–44 (2008) (considering only corruption). See,
e.g., Randall, 548 U.S. at 241–42, 244–45, 246–49; Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 441, 444–45,
456; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388–96 (2000); FEC v. Nat’l Right to
Work, 459 U.S. 197, 208–10 (1982); Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 195, 197–99; McCutcheon, 134
S. Ct. at 1441 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)). This is “an
effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties,” i.e., “an act akin to
bribery.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–48 (applying this principle to contributions and
independent spending).
34
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 176–77).
35
Contra Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51–54 (holding that limits on contributions to one’s own
campaign are unconstitutional); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232 (holding a ban on contributions
by minors unconstitutional); Randall, 548 U.S. at 246–62 (holding a limit on contributions
unconstitutional); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60 (holding aggregate contribution limits
unconstitutional).
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contrary to the principle that contribution limits must rise or fall on their
own merits.36
To put it another way: on the one hand, when law is constitutional,
there is nothing wrong with legally circumventing it; however, there is
something wrong with illegally circumventing it. This is the difference
between avoiding and evading taxes—avoiding taxes is legal, while
evading them is not.37 On the other hand, when a court enjoins
unconstitutional law, government may not enforce it, and there is
nothing wrong with circumventing it.
D. Organizations Engaging in Only Independent Spending
The District of Columbia Circuit holds that government may never
limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent
spending.38 A Supreme Court concurrence agrees.39 This is the
controlling opinion in California Medical Association v. FEC.40 The Fourth
Circuit also agrees, holding that “contribution limits are . . . unacceptable
when applied to . . . independent[-]expenditure committees[.]”41 The
organizations “furthest removed from the candidate” are those that
engage in only independent spending.42 It “is ‘implausible’ that
contributions to independent[-]expenditure political committees are
corrupting.”43 The Seventh and Tenth Circuits resoundingly agree.44

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232; Randall, 548 U.S. at 246–
62; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51–54.
37
THE
LAW
DICTIONARY,
What
is
Tax
Avoidance?,
available
at
http://thelawdictionary.org/tax-avoidance (last visited Feb. 13, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/R9JR-U32Y.
38
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 553 (2010); see Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 9–11, 14–15 & n.13, 15–16 n.14 (holding that
government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent
spending).
39
See Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating
that “contributions to a committee that makes only independent expenditures pose
no . . . threat . . . of actual or potential corruption”).
40
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1099 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)); Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 9 n.8 (citing Marks, 430 U.S.
at 193).
41
NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 292–93 (4th Cir. 2008).
42
Id. at 293.
43
Id. (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL-II), 344 F.3d 418, 434 (4th Cir.
2003), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 541 U.S. 1007 (2004)).
44
See Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1095–97 (holding that government may not
limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent spending); Wis. Right to
Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that
government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only independent
spending). Barland-I holds:
36
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The Fifth Circuit holds not that a limit, but a source ban on contributions
from corporations, and by extension unions, for independent spending is
unconstitutional.45 The Ninth Circuit’s approach in effect closes the door
on limiting contributions for independent spending except when
contributors are foreign nationals. The key to the inquiry is whether
contributors themselves are “entitled to exercise individually” the First
Amendment right to spending for political speech that they “enjoy and
effectuate” by making contributions for independent spending.46 Only
Wisconsin’s $10,000 aggregate annual contribution limit is
unconstitutional as applied to organizations, like the [Wisconsin] Right
to Life [State] PAC, that engage only in independent expenditures for
political speech. This is true even though the statute limits
contributions, not expenditures. Whether strict scrutiny or the [exacting,]
“closely drawn” standard applies, the anticorruption rationale cannot
serve as a justification for limiting fundraising by groups that engage
in independent spending on political speech. No other justification for
limits on political speech has been recognized, and none is offered
here.
Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 154 (emphasis in original). Quoting Barland-I, Republican Party of New
Mexico holds “there is no valid governmental interest sufficient to justify imposing limits
on fundraising by independent-expenditure organizations.” Republican Party of N.M., 741
F.3d at 1095.
45
Texans for Free Enter. v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2013).
See Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d 645
F.3d 1109, 1118–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (ordering a preliminary injunction against, inter alia, a
contribution-source ban). Treating contributions by corporations and unions differently
violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 634–35 (Colo.
2010) (holding that there was no compelling government interest in treating corporations
and unions differently). Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker held otherwise and left
this question for the Supreme Court. 717 F.3d 576, 603 (IRLC-II) (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). Texans for Free Enter., 732 F.3d at 538.
46
Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach holds organizations
engaging in only independent spending:
[P]rovide a distinct medium through which citizens may collectively
enjoy and effectuate those expressive freedoms that they are entitled to
exercise individually. Many “individuals contribute to a political
organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a more
effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their own
personal direction.” Just as the soloist’s song becomes more powerful
when joined by a chorus of people singing along, . . . citizen[s’]
message[s] may become more widely and effectively disseminated
when [t]he[y] join[] an [organization] of like-minded citizens.
603 F.3d 684, 698 (9th Cir. 2010); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–51 (1976) (holding that
government may not limit spending for political speech); see also Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 698
(holding that government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only
independent spending); Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 867–68 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012)
(applying Long Beach to recall elections); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1118–21 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that government may not limit contributions to organizations engaging in only
independent spending); Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085–87 (D. Haw.
2010), appeal dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (applying Long Beach, granting a
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when contributors are foreign nationals do they not have a First
Amendment right to engage in the same speech as the “contributees.”47
E. Organizations Making Contributions Too
The Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits apply these same
principles when organizations both make contributions and engage in
independent spending for political speech from separate accounts. Each
of these circuits holds limits on contributions that organizations receive
for independent spending are unconstitutional.48
How can quid pro quo corruption of candidates or officeholders, or its
appearance, ever arise when organizations engaging in only independent
spending for political speech receive contributions from persons who
themselves have a First Amendment right to engage in the same speech
as the organizations? And how can quid pro quo corruption of candidates
preliminary-injunction motion on an as-applied contribution-limit claim, and inadvertently
rejecting a facial holding the plaintiffs did not seek); Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d
1023, 1039–42 (D. Haw. 2012), appeal docketed on other grounds, No.12-15913 (9th Cir. Apr. 20,
2012) (granting summary judgment on the contribution-limit claim and correcting the
previous holding).
Whether the person challenging a contribution limit is a contributor or a contributee is
immaterial. See, e.g., Yamada, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1080–81 (addressing contributors); BarlandI, 664 F.3d at 147 (addressing a contributee). A contributor’s right to make contributions
would be useless if a contributee lacked the right to receive them. Similarly, a contributee’s
right to receive contributions would be useless if a contributor lacked the right to make
them—it would be like a beautiful car without gasoline. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18
(cited in Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 692) (comparing being “free to engage in unlimited political
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures” with “being free to drive an automobile as
far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline”).
47
See supra notes 22, 27 and accompanying text (explaining that limits on contributions
for independent spending are unconstitutional when the contributors are not foreign
nationals). Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441e (now
52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012)) (stating the Court “need not reach the question of whether the
[g]overnment has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations
from” making contributions or independent expenditures).
48
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1097 (10th Cir. 2013); Emily’s List v.
FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Republican Party of New Mexico states:
If a contribution to outside groups for the purpose of making
independent expenditures implicates the government’s anti-corruption
interest, then the same interest is implicated by the independent
expenditures themselves. This would mean that “the entire Buckley
edifice, built on a foundation of a contribution-expenditure dichotomy,
falls.” Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New
Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 70 (2004). “Is that what the Court
really intended buried in a few sentences of a footnote in one of the
longest cases in Supreme Court history?” Id. See also Emily’s List, 581
F.3d at 14 n.13 (declining to adopt expansive reading of footnote 48).
741 F.3d at 1100 n.7 (discussing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 n.48 (2003)).
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or officeholders, or its appearance, ever arise when organizations making
contributions and engaging in independent spending for political speech
receive contributions for independent spending from persons who
themselves have a First Amendment right to engage in the same speech
as the organizations?
Since there is no corrupting link between candidates or officeholders
and organizations’ independent spending, the presence of contributions
from persons who themselves have a First Amendment right to engage
in the same speech as the organizations, cannot somehow create that
missing corrupting link. First, as a matter of law, organizations’
independent spending cannot be a “corrupt ‘quo’”; second, as a matter of
law, contributions for organizations’ independent spending cannot be a
“corrupting ‘quid[,]’” because only government officials have the power
to grant corrupt or apparently corrupt “political favors.”49 Again, it is
not that the corrupting link is “broken”—it is just not there.50 It does not
matter whether the contribution limit is 1 cent, $1, $1000, or $1 million.51
Except as to contributions from foreign nationals, contribution limits are
unconstitutional per se as applied to contributions for independent
spending, so government is without power to say how big is big
enough.52 The size of the contribution limit is immaterial.53
Even if a contributee has “interests closely aligned with a political
party, this alignment would not change the analysis because, under
49
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553
(2010) (followed in Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 154
(7th Cir. 2011)); see Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12 (explaining that government may limit
contributions that are, in turn, used for contributions yet not contributions that are, in turn,
used for independent spending); FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (quoted in
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)). The NCRL-III dissent—which VRLC-II
follows—misses this by focusing on whether organizations can cause corruption or its
appearance instead of whether particular speech can. VRLC-II v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 141
n.22 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). Compare NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d
274, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael, J., dissenting) (focusing on whether organizations are
coordinated), with infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (explaining that the question is
not whether organizations are coordinated but whether the particular speech is
coordinated with a candidate).
50
AFEC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011).
51
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (quoting NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493)
(holding that “First Amendment rights are important regardless whether the individual is,
on the one hand, a ‘lone pamphleteer or street corner orator in the Tom Paine mold,’ or is,
on the other, someone who spends ‘substantial amounts of money in order to communicate
his political ideas through sophisticated’ means” (brackets and ellipses omitted)).
52
See supra notes 22, 27 and accompanying text (explaining that limits on contributions
for independent spending are unconstitutional when the contributors are not foreign
nationals).
53
Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50–54 (1976) (striking down limits on contributions
made to one’s own campaign).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 7

372

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Supreme Court precedent, political parties [can] also make unlimited
independent expenditures.”54 Republican Party of New Mexico v. King’s
“caveat” about political parties’ receiving contributions for independent
spending is dictum, because no political party even had a claim at stake
in the Republican Party of New Mexico appeal, much less sought to receive
unlimited contributions for independent spending.55
Under McCutcheon, “the risk of quid pro quo corruption is generally
applicable only to ‘the narrow category of money gifts that are
directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.’”56 That is not what happens
when organizations use contributions for independent spending.57
There is no “risk of” a “direct exchange of an official act for money.”58
Such contributions are not “used for” contributions.59 They are not
“directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.”60 There is no McCutcheon
exchange or its appearance, much less any involving “large” or
“massive” contributions to candidates.61
F. Circuit Splits
Three circuit opinions have created circuit splits, with Vermont Right
to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell (VRLC-II) alone splitting in multiple
54
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 2013) (recalling the
district court’s holding).
55
Id. at 1098–99, 1102–03; infra notes 129–132 and accompanying text. Republican Party of
N.M. 741 F.3d at 1091, 1092, 1097 (“only non-party political committees have challenged the
constitutionality of the law as applied to them”). By contrast, in Republican Nat’l Comm. v.
FEC, political parties did challenge limits on contributions for independent spending.
No.14-00853, VERIFIED COMPL. ¶¶1–5, 11–16 (D.D.C. May 23, 2014), voluntarily dismissed,
(D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/V96J-3LWT. However, the result would
be the same, because political parties present no “special danger[] of [quid pro quo]
corruption” or its appearance, so government may not limit contributions that political
parties receive for independent spending. Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616
(1996). And “the constitutionally significant fact” in assessing whether particular speech—
not the entire political-party organization, but the particular speech—is independent, “is
the lack of coordination” with candidates. Id. at 617.
56
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 310 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
57
Anyway, “there is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when
money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a
candidate directly.” Id.
58
Id. at 1441, 1452 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)). There is
no “effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties,” i.e., no “act akin to
bribery.” Id. at 1450; id. 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59
See supra note 20 (quoting Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1091–93
n.2 (10th Cir. 2013)) (holding that government may not limit contributions that are “used
for” independent spending, even when the contributee also makes contributions).
60
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.
61
Id. at 1441, 1450–53 (citations omitted).
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ways.62 First, the plaintiff-contributee, Vermont Right to Life Committee
Fund for Independent Political Expenditures (“VRLC-FIPE”), is a
political committee connected to Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc.
(“VRLC”).63 VRLC-II finds VRLC-FIPE is part of one organization with
another political committee, Vermont Right to Life Committee—Political
VRLC-II
Committee (“VRLC-PC”), which makes contributions.64
expressly splits with North Carolina Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Leake
(NCRL-III). NCRL-III addresses parallel North Carolina organizations
and holds NCRL-FIPE is “independent as a matter of law” from NCRL
and NCRL-PAC.65 As a matter of law, a political committee that an
organization forms/has is a legal person unto itself; it is not part of
another organization—its speech is its own.66
Second, VRLC-II addresses “circumvention of contribution limits”
without acknowledging that government may prevent “circumvention”
In other words,
but not with otherwise unconstitutional law.67
preventing “circumvention” cannot justify otherwise unconstitutional
law.68 VRLC-II splits with Republican Party of New Mexico’s holding that
“there can be no freestanding anti-circumvention interest.”69
Third, VRLC-II holds the government may limit contributions to
organizations making contributions and may not limit contributions to
organizations engaging in only independent spending.70 However, even
conceding arguendo all of Defendants’ asserted undisputed facts,
including that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are one organization and that
VRLC-II v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 139–45 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015).
VRLC is not a political committee and challenges Vermont law requiring it to be one.
Id. at 135–39.
64
See id. at 140, 142, 143–44 (describing the organizations).
65
Id. at 141 (quoting NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 294 n.8 (4th Cir. 2008)).
66
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) (holding that a political committee
that an organization forms/has “is a separate association from the” organization); Cal.
Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (holding that a political committee that an
organization forms/has “is a separate legal entity” from the organization). Alaska Right to
Life Committee v. Miles (ARLC) implicitly recognizes this even when “three entities share the
same director and the same board of directors” and the “degree of financial separation
among the three entities is unclear from the record.” 441 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 886 (2006). Claiming that a political committee that an organization
forms/has “is merely the mouthpiece” of another organization “is untenable.” Cal. Med.
Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 196. The fact that another organization “agree[s] with the views” of the
political committee “does not convert” the political committee’s “speech into that of” the
other organization. Id.
67
VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 140 n.20; McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452–60 (2014).
68
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452–60.
69
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 761 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2013).
70
VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 139 (quoting Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 140 (2d Cir. 2004),
rev’d on other grounds, 548 U.S. 230 (2006)); id. at 140 (citing New York Progress & Protection
PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013)).
62
63
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VRLC-FIPE “is completely enmeshed with VRLC-PC[,]” VRLC-II does
not recognize a crucial point.71 It does not recognize that organizations
that both make contributions and engage in independent spending—as
the alleged “single” VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC organization does—may
The
receive unlimited contributions for independent spending.72
organization “merely needs to ensure that its contributions to parties
[other than for independent spending] or candidates come from an
account set up for that purpose, not one used for independent
expenditures.”73 VRLC-PC and VRLC-FIPE have separate accounts, just
as a victorious Republican Party of New Mexico plaintiff does.74 Thus,
VRLC-II splits with Republican Party of New Mexico and Emily’s List v.
FEC.75
Fourth, along that same line and most importantly, even conceding
arguendo all of Defendants’ asserted undisputed facts, including that
VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are one organization and that VRLC-FIPE “is
enmeshed completely with VRLC-PC[,]” VRLC-FIPE still prevails
because Defendants did not prove any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives
is “used for” anything other than independent spending for political
speech.76 That, not Defendants’ facts, is the crucial—and now a circuitsplitting—question.
Defendants never responded to, much less
Id. at 141–44.
See id. at 140–41 (recognizing only “independent-expenditure-only” organizations).
VRLC-II implies they may not, and this is at the heart of the VRLC-II circuit split. See id. at
141 (citing Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 43
(D.D.C. 2012) (holding that “separate bank account[s]”—which VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC
have—do “not prevent coordinated expenditures”); id. at 144 (finding “VRLC-FIPE is not
meaningfully distinct from VRLC-PC” and therefore affirming summary judgment on the
contribution limit).
But preventing organizations’ coordinated spending—i.e.,
contributions—is unnecessary for the organizations to receive unlimited contributions for
independent spending. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–47, 78 (1976); Republican Party of
N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097; Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Instead, the
relevant inquiry is whether Defendants proved any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is
used for anything other than independent spending for political speech. Infra notes 76–77
and accompanying text.
73
Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097 (citing Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12).
74
VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143; Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097.
75
Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097; VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 141 (citing Emily’s List,
581 F.3d at 12).
76
VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 141–44 & n.23 (finding that “the record does not show that funds
from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions”); see supra note 20 (quoting
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1091, 1092, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013)
(holding that government may not limit contributions that are “used for” independent
spending, even when the contributee also makes contributions); see also Republican Party of
N.M., 741 F.3d at 1096 (“contributions for the purpose of making independent
expenditures”); id. at 1103 (“used solely for”). Cf. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203
(1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that “contributions to a committee that makes
only independent expenditures pose no . . . threat . . . of actual or potential corruption”).
71
72
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disputed, this. What remains is “conjecture” regarding “recontributed
funds” or contributions “rerouted to candidates[.]”77
Indeed, VRLC-II acknowledges “that the record does not show that
funds from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions.”78
However, VRLC-II means only direct contributions to candidates.79 Yet
Defendants also did not prove any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is
“used for” any indirect contribution to candidates, i.e., contributions to
candidates via intermediaries or spending for political speech
coordinated with candidates.80 By nevertheless holding that Vermont
may limit contributions that VRLC-FIPE receives, VRLC-II splits with
Republican Party of New Mexico and Emily’s List.81
Holding that mere voter guides are coordinated spending splits with
Clifton v. FEC, because “coordination” implies “collaboration beyond”

77
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452, 1457 (2014) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000)).
78
VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143 n.23 (finding that “the record does not show that funds from
VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions”); cf. id. at 143 (explaining voter guides
and fundraising). VRLC-II finds this even while finding “fluidity of funds between VRLCFIPE and VRLC-PC.” Id. at 143. The reason is that the “fluidity” Defendants allege all
flows from VRLC and VRLC-PC (which makes contributions) to VRLC-FIPE (which does
not), not vice-versa. E.g., id. at 143 & n.23 (finding “fluidity of funds between VRLC-FIPE
and VRLC-PC” while overlooking that “funds” flow from VRLC and VRLC-PC (which
makes contributions) to VRLC-FIPE (which does not), not vice-versa)); Vt. Right to Life
Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, No.2:09-cv-188, PLS.’ SUMM. J. RESP. BR. at 41–42 & n.48 (D. Vt. Nov.
18, 2011) (refuting Defendants’ fluidity-of-funds argument and showing that the alleged
fluidity of funds is not a genuine issue of material fact, because the only alleged fluidity of
“funds” flows from VRLC and VRLC-PC (which makes contributions) to VRLC-FIPE
(which does not), not vice-versa); accord VRLC-II, PLS.-APPELLANTS’ VRLC & VRLC-FIPE’S
REPLY BR. at 39–48 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2012) (citing the district-court record and showing that
Defendants did not prove any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is used for anything other
than independent spending for political speech). So the “fluidity” Defendants allege
cannot mean any contribution VRLC-FIPE itself receives is used for anything other than
independent spending. VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143.
79
See VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143 n.23 (finding that “the record does not show that funds
from VRLC-FIPE were used for candidate contributions”). Direct contributions are one
form of contributions to candidates under the Constitution. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 23 n.24 (1976).
80
VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143 n.23; see supra note 76 and accompanying text (highlighting
the term “used for”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 n.24; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 219–21
(2003); Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1996); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47, 78
(quoted in FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 1995)) (discussing
particular speech coordinated with candidates). Contributions can lead to quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance only when candidates are involved. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at
1452.
81
Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097; VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 141 (citing Emily’s List
v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
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merely asking for candidates’ positions on issues.82 So asking for and
publishing candidates’ positions on issues is not coordinated spending.83
Nor did Defendants show under McCutcheon any “direct exchange of an
official act for money” or its appearance, or that contributions “are
directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.”84 Much less did they show
any “large”/“massive” contributions to candidates.85
Fifth, even conceding arguendo that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are
one organization, VRLC-II errs in how it assesses under constitutional law
whether VRLC-FIPE engages in coordinated spending: VRLC-II asks
whether organizations are coordinated.86 Instead, the question is whether

82
VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 144; Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1311 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1108 (1998) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47).
83
Cf. Colo. Republican-I, 518 U.S. at 613–20 (cited in Clifton, 114 F.3d at 1311). Otherwise,
every voter guide would be coordinated spending, and therefore a contribution. But see 11
C.F.R. § 109.21.f (establishing post-Clifton that a “candidate’s or a political[-]party
committee’s response to an inquiry about that candidate’s or political[-]party committee’s
positions on legislative or policy issues, but not including a discussion of campaign plans,
projects, activities or needs,” is not coordinated spending).
84
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266
(1991)). They showed no “effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official
duties,”—i.e., no “act akin to bribery.” Id. at 1450, 1452; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 1450–53.
86
See VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 142 (asking “whether a group is functionally distinct from a
non-independent-expenditure-only” organization (emphasis added)); id. at 144 (finding
that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC coordinated voter guides and the VRLC’s executive director
advised a gubernatorial candidate/campaign on issues); id. at 144–45 (focusing on VRLCFIPE and “its independence from” VRLC-PC, not the independence of particular speech);
id. at 145 (focusing on whether “VRLC-FIPE is indistinguishable from VRLC-PC” and not
the independence of particular speech). The NCRL-III dissent, which VRLC-II follows,
makes the same mistake. See NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael,
J., dissenting). This VRLC-II holding makes it more than “difficult at times” for low-budget
organizations to receive unlimited contributions for independent spending. VRLC-II, 758
F.3d at 145. It makes it nearly impossible. Low-budget organizations such as VRLC,
VRLC-FIPE, and VRLC-PC cannot afford not to work together. Their working together is
not coordination under the Constitution. See infra note 87 and accompanying text
(discussing further whether particular speech is coordinated with candidates); cf. Long
Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 698 (9th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (holding that persons who “individually” have a First
Amendment right to engage in particular speech may “collectively enjoy and effectuate
those expressive freedoms”). If their working together were coordination, if their joint
speech were coordinated, and if VRLC-FIPE were constitutionally ineligible to receive
unlimited contributions for independent spending, then two other similarly-situated, lowbudget plaintiffs would have lost—but they won. See Wis. Right to Life State PAC v.
Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011); NCRL-III, 525 F.3d at 291–95.
Firewalls are not affordable for low-budget organizations—not even the FEC requires
them. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21.h. Besides, under McCutcheon, First Amendment rights are
important regardless of the size of the speaker. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (quoting FEC
v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985)).
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particular speech is coordinated with candidates.87 Defendants did not
show VRLC-FIPE coordinates particular speech with candidates, much
less that any contribution VRLC-FIPE receives is “used for” coordinating
particular speech with candidates.88 Considering whether organizations
are coordinated splits with Republican Party of New Mexico and Clifton.89
Nor did Defendants show any “approval (or wink or nod)” by any
candidate/candidate’s committee—i.e., an “arrangement with a
candidate[,]”
or
a
“request
or
suggestion”
from
the
candidate/candidate’s committee.90
Sixth, VRLC may and does “wholly control” its own political
committees.91 Yet if such control meant VRLC-FIPE may not receive
unlimited contributions for independent spending, then plaintiff-

87
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357
(2010), quoting, in turn, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)) (“The absence of
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his
agent . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate” (emphasis added));
FEC v. Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. 431, 437–45 (2001) (focusing repeatedly on
“expenditures” and “spending”). The fact that organizations coordinate some speech with
candidates does not prevent them from engaging in other, independent speech. Colo.
Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 437–65; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 215–18 (2003). Otherwise,
the government would have won in Colorado Republican-I—but instead the Court held that
“the constitutionally significant fact” in assessing whether particular speech—not the entire
political-party organization, but the particular speech—is independent from “the lack of
coordination” with candidates. Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 617 (1996). So
coordination among organizations—i.e., organizations’ working together—does not
establish that VRLC-FIPE makes contributions, or that any contribution VRLC-FIPE
receives is used for anything other than independent spending. Otherwise, no corporation,
union, or other organization and its political committee could ever work together without
coordinated spending, and therefore contributions, occurring.
88
See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining coordination). Even under
Vermont law, Defendants did not prove coordination. Compare VRLC-II v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d
118, 143 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015), with VT. STAT. 2941.B, VT. ADMIN.
RULE 2000-1.2, and Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376, 408 n.25 (D.
Vt. 2012) (“The record does not evidence any expenditures designated as [VRLC-]FIPE’s
that were undertaken at the [Brian] Dubie [gubernatorial] campaign’s explicit direction.”).
89
See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1096 n.4 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010)) (stating that “Citizens United did not treat
corruption as a fact question to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the Court
considered whether independent speech is the type that poses a risk of quid pro quo corruption
or the appearance thereof. . . . The Court determined that speech through independent
expenditures does not pose such a risk.”). Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1311 (1st Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47) (focusing on
particular speech).
90
Vt. Right to Life, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 408 n.25; Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. at 442–43;
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 222 (2003). Even the FEC requires this. 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20–
21.
91
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003).
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organizations in three other appeals would have lost—but they won.92
Moreover, by looking to the board-appointment process, board
membership, committee membership, identical meeting times, and
VRLC-FIPE’s and VRLC-PC’s discussing “important tactical campaign
issues” together, VRLC-II splits with Alaska Right to Life Committee v.
Miles (ARLC).93 Under ARLC, VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are separate
even if they “share the same director and the same board of directors”
and the “degree of financial separation among the three entities is
unclear from the record.”94 VRLC-II also splits with Republican Party of
New Mexico, under which “overlapping leadership” among VRLC,
VRLC-PC, and VRLC-FIPE does not help Defendants.95 Like the parallel,
low-budget plaintiffs in NCRL-III, VRLC, VRLC-FIPE, and VRLC-PC
“share staff”; sharing leadership/staff is not only legal but also common,
because it saves money and prevents operating at cross purposes.96
The second of three circuit splits is in Alabama Democratic Conference
v. Broussard, which upholds limits on contributions to an organization
that both makes contributions and engages in independent spending,
because “both accounts are controlled and can be coordinated by the
same entity.”97 Without saying so, this presumes the question is whether
the organization—in any of its activity—can cause quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance.98 But instead, the question is whether
particular speech can.99 The fact that organizations may and do “wholly
control” political committees that they form/have does not mean their
VRLC-II v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 143 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015).
Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011);
Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 696–99 (9th
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010); NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 291–95 (4th Cir.
2008).
93
VRLC-II, 758 F.3d at 143–44.
94
Id. at 143–44; ARLC v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 886
(2006). Even the FEC understands the same people can be part of both an organization and
its political committees. See ADVISORY OP. 2010-09 at 1–4 (Club for Growth) (FEC July 22,
2010).
95
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2013).
96
NCRL-III, 525 F.3d at 294 n.8; see Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 143 (addressing other parallel
plaintiffs).
97
Ala. Democratic Conference v. Broussard, 541 F. App’x 931, 935 (11th Cir. 2013)
(unpublished).
98
While discussing organizations that make contributions and engage in independent
spending, Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC expressly inquires whether
the organizations cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38, 40–
44 (D.D.C. 2012) (addressing entities, a PAC, a hybrid PAC, and a single entity).
99
See supra notes 79, 83 and accompanying text (asking whether particular speech by an
organization, not the organization itself, can cause quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance). Republican Party of New Mexico, 741 F.3d at 1096 n.4, 1102 n.11, expressly
disagrees with Alabama Democratic Conference, 541 F. App’x at 931.
92
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independent spending can cause quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance.100 Merely finding that organizations contribute to each
other, have common members, or receive contributions from candidates
cannot establish that contributions the organizations make cause quid pro
quo corruption or its appearance absent evidence that the contributions
go to candidates.101
The third of three circuit splits is Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee
Leadership Fund v. FEC.102 Stop this Insanity misses the point when it tells
the plaintiff-political committee, which wants to receive unlimited
contributions for an independent-spending fund/account, that the
political committee’s connected organization may instead receive
unlimited contributions for independent spending.103 The plaintiffpolitical committee is “a separate association” and “a separate legal
entity” and has its own rights.104 If Stop this Insanity were correct,
connected political committees in three other appeals would have lost—
but they won.105 Stop this Insanity also relies on the need for “disclosure”
to support limiting contributions for independent spending.106
However, disclosure and limits are separate concepts.107

FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003); supra note 92 and accompanying text.
Ala. Democratic Conference, 541 F. App’x at 936; McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434,
1452 (2014).
102
Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC, 761 F.3d 10, 17 (D.C. Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Stop this
Insanity on the same day that—and on the same page where—it denied certiorari in VRLC-II
v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015).
103
See generally 52 U.S.C. § 30101.7 (2012) (defining connected organization); Emily’s List
v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 8 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (presenting a facial challenge). Stop this Insanity,
761 F.3d at 14; see Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 32, 44 (saying the same both about
the connected organization and about another political committee).
104
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182,
196 (1981).
105
Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 155 (7th Cir. 2011)
(addressing WRTL-SPAC, a political committee connected to WRTL); Long Beach Area
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 699 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (addressing political committees connected to the chamber); NCRL-III
v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 295 (4th Cir. 2008) (addressing NCRL-FIPE, a political committee
connected to NCRL).
106
Stop this Insanity, 761 F.3d at 16–17.
107
See Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1082 n.9 (D. Haw. 2010), appeal
dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (recognizing that disclosure and limits are
separate concepts).
100
101
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G. Aberrant District Court Orders
The Stop this Insanity district court order believes Emily’s List does
not address contributions for independent spending.108 But Emily’s List
does.109 Stop this Insanity also believes case law on contributions received
for independent spending does not apply to such contributions received
by connected political committees.110 But it does.111 The order further
believes case law does not apply to connected political committees
making contributions and independent expenditures properly understood
from separate accounts.112 But it does.113 And, notwithstanding Stop this
Insanity, whether independent spending is an independent expenditure
does not matter here.114
Meanwhile, Catholic Leadership Coalition of Texas v. Reisman upholds a
limit on contributions for independent spending—it presumes that a
contribution/contact list which an organization receives only for
independent spending must also be for contributions that the organization
makes, which is not true.115
H. Possible Counterarguments
Any holding regarding the facial constitutionality of contribution
limits in general is of no moment to challenges to limits on contributions
for independent spending, because the latter challenges are as-applied

108
See Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (holding incorrectly that Emily’s List v.
FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), does not control).
109
Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 4–5, 15–18.
110
Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 29, 31–32, 42 n.23 (saying incorrectly and without
explanation that “disclosure requirements” would be “meaningless”).
111
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing connected political committees).
112
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & n.52, 80 (1976) (defining express advocacy and
thereby independent expenditure); Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 41. The plaintiffpolitical committee seeks to make contributions and engage in independent spending from
separate funds/accounts, so it is a “hybrid” political committee. Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12;
contra Stop this Insanity, 761 F.3d at 15 (“not a ‘hybrid’”).
113
See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1097 (10th Cir. 2013); Emily’s List,
581 F.3d at 12.
114
Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 40–42 & n.19 (“express advocacy”); see supra note
8–9 and accompanying text (explaining that a person who has a First Amendment right to
engage in independent expenditures has a First Amendment right to engage in any
independent spending for political speech).
115
Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, No.A-12-CA-566-SS, 2013 WL 2404066,
at *15–16 & n.3 (W.D. Tex. May 30, 2013). The Fifth Circuit affirmed on this claim, and
otherwise affirmed in part and reversed on other grounds. Catholic Leadership Coal. of
Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 442–45 (5th Cir. 2014).
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challenges.116 Only in the California Medical Association concurrence,
which is the controlling opinion, does the Supreme Court address the
constitutionality of limiting contributions for independent spending.117
Other Supreme Court opinions do not.
The California Medical Association plurality addresses a political
committee that by definition makes contributions to candidates.118 The
fact that the political committee may also engage in independent
spending does not change the fact that the plurality does not address
independent spending.119 Only the concurrence does.120 When the
plurality refers to a political committee’s “independent political
advocacy[,]” that means the California Medical Association PAC’s
political advocacy is independent of the California Medical Association
in the sense that the political committee “is a separate legal entity” from
the California Medical Association as a matter of law.121
FEC v. National Conservative PAC’s statement about limiting
contributions for independent spending is dictum, because no
contribution limit was at issue.122 Even if this dictum supported limiting
contributions for independent spending when the Court decided
NCPAC, subsequent opinions control for the reasons discussed next in
addressing Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC
(Colorado Republican-I).123
116
E.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1095–97 (ruling on an as-applied challenge);
Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 151–55 (7th Cir. 2011)
(ruling on an as-applied challenge).
117
Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra
notes 39–40 and accompanying text (discussing the concurring opinion, which is the
controlling opinion and states that government may never limit contributions to
organizations engaging in only independent spending).
118
Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 185 n.1, 197 n.17; id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1093, 1098–99.
119
E.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 n.48 (2003) (stating that the California Medical
Association statute “restricted . . . the source and amount of funds available to engage in
noncoordinated expenditures”).
120
Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Republican Party of N.M., 741
F.3d at 1098–99. Stop this Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. FEC incorrectly believes
the California Medical Association plurality and the Buckley v. Valeo Court address
contributions for independent spending. See Stop this Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 33, 43
(misinterpreting California Medical Association and Buckley).
121
Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 196; see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) (“a
separate association”).
122
FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 484, 495 (1985) (“the present cases involve [limits] on
expenditures by PACs, not on the contributions they receive; and in any event these
contributions are predominantly small and thus do not raise the same concerns as the
sizable contributions involved in California Medical Ass[ociatio]n”).
123
NCPAC and Colorado Republican-I did not support limiting contributions for
independent spending, and courts did not need Citizens United to hold that government
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The Colorado Republican-I plurality’s statement regarding
contributions that political parties receive for independent spending
incorrectly presumes independent spending can cause corruption, and
does not contemplate receiving contributions for a separate independentspending account.124 Anyway, the statement is dictum, because no
contribution limit was at issue.125 Even if this dictum supported limiting
contributions for independent spending when the Court decided
Colorado Republican-I, subsequent opinions—including Citizens United,
AFEC, and McCutcheon—control in a way that extends beyond limits on
independent spending for political speech to limits on contributions for
independent spending for political speech.126 Regardless of whether preCitizens United opinions helped the cause of limiting contributions for
independent spending before Citizens United, they do not do so after

may not limit contributions for independent spending. See Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1,
9–12 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending postNCPAC, post-Colorado Republican-I, and pre-Citizens United); NCRL-III v. Leake, 525 F.3d
274, 291 (4th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a limit on contributions for independent spending postNCPAC, post-Colorado Republican-I, and pre-Citizens United).
124
See Colo. Republican-I v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 617 (1996). Colorado Republican-I states:
The greatest danger of corruption, therefore, appears to be from the
ability of donors to give sums up to $20,000 to a party which may be
used for independent party expenditures for the benefit of a particular
candidate. We could understand how Congress, were it to conclude
that the potential for evasion of the individual contribution limits was
a serious matter, might decide to change the statute’s limit[]s on
contributions to political parties.
Id. And Colorado Republican-I cites the California Medical Association v. FEC plurality, 453
U.S. at 197–99, which does not address contributions for independent spending. See supra
notes 117–121 and accompanying text (discussing the California Medical Association
plurality’s opinion).
125
See Colorado Republican-I, 518 U.S. at 608–13 (discussing independent expenditures).
126
Again, the Colorado Republican-I dictum did not support limiting contributions for
independent spending. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing post-Colorado
Republican-I opinions holding that government may not limit contributions for independent
spending); see also Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d
at 694–95 n.5, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010) (holding post-Citizens United that government
may not limit contributions for independent spending); SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d
686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) (holding post-Citizens
United that government may not limit contributions for independent spending).
Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1094–95, 1098–99 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding
post-Citizens United that government may not limit contributions for independent
spending); Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland (Barland-I), 664 F.3d 139, 153–54 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding post-Citizens United that government may not limit contributions for
independent spending); Yamada v. Kuramoto, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083–84 (D. Haw.
2010), appeal dismissed, No.10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (holding post-Citizens United that
government may not limit contributions for independent spending).
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Citizens United.127 The only government interest in banning, or otherwise
limiting, political speech—whether contributions or spending—is the
prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Independent
spending does not cause quid pro quo corruption or its appearance,
especially after McCutcheon narrows quid pro quo corruption and its
appearance. Contributions for independent spending, even ones that are
large/massive, are not directed to candidates, so they cannot cause quid
pro quo corruption or its appearance.128
Even circuit opinions issued between Citizens United and McCutcheon
apply the Citizens United quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance
framework to contributions for independent spending, not just
independent spending itself.129
The reasons McConnell v. FEC does not support limiting
contributions for independent spending are simpler and more basic than
some circuits’ analyses.130
While McConnell addresses, for example, 2 U.S.C. § 441i (now 52
U.S.C. § 30125), part of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”),
Law can be facially
McConnell is entirely a facial challenge.131

127
E.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1096, 1098–1102 (discussing how Citizens
United impacts the analysis).
128
See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text (defining quid pro quo corruption).
129
E.g., Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1094–95 (applying the quid pro quocorruption-or-its-appearance framework to contributions for independent spending);
Barland-I, 664 F.3d at 153–54 (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance
framework to contributions for independent spending); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645
F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance
framework to contributions for independent spending); Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 696–99;
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694–96 (applying the quid pro quo-corruption-or-its-appearance
framework to contributions for independent spending).
130
The analysis is not complicated. See supra note 20 (quoting Republican Party of N.M.,
741 F.3d at 1091, 1092, 1093 n.2) (holding that government may not limit contributions that
are “used for” independent spending, even when the contributee also makes
contributions). Nevertheless, three circuits have indulged complicated dicta. See Republican
Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1099–1100 (addressing political parties, the discussion of which is
dictum, because no political party sought to receive unlimited contributions for
independent spending); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 696)
(stating that “the contribution limits in McConnell and [Cal. Med. Ass’n] were justified by an
anti-corruption interest because the regulated entities had unusually close relationships
with the candidates they supported”—all of which was dictum, because no “unusually
close relationships” were at issue in Thalheimer or Long Beach); Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d
1, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (addressing political parties, the discussion of which is dictum,
because no political party sought to receive unlimited contributions for independent
spending).
131
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 154–85 (2003). See also Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v.
Barland (Barland-II), 751 F.3d 804, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that McConnell’s
decision to uphold the law facially does not mean it is always constitutional as applied).
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constitutional and still be unconstitutional as applied to particular
speech.132
Moreover, this part of FECA reaches donations for speech other than
independent spending. That is, this part of FECA reaches not just
donations to organizations that engage in only independent spending, or
organizations that both make contributions and engage in independent
spending from separate accounts. This part of FECA also reaches
donations to other organizations.133 In addressing what was solely a
facial challenge, McConnell had no need to parse facts for subsequent asapplied challenges.134 Thus, the issues in McConnell are distinguishable.
Because McConnell is not about only independent spending, it is
incorrect to believe McConnell applies.
Caperton v. Massey does not support limiting contributions for
independent spending. Rather, Caperton addresses whether an elected
state-court justice should have recused himself when an officer of a
corporation before the Court had engaged in independent expenditures,
and had contributed to a committee that engaged in independent

E.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134 (“a facial First Amendment challenge”); id. at 174 (“on its
face”); id. at 181 (“plaintiffs’ facial challenge”).
132
Compare McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190–94 (upholding the FECA electioneeringcommunication ban facially), with Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL-I), 546 U.S. 410,
411–12 (2006) (holding that McConnell’s facial holding does not preclude as-applied
challenges).
133
See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30125(a)–(b), (d)–(f) (2012) (reaching donations to other
organizations). For example, Sections 30125(a) and (b) address federal political-party
committees, and state and local political-party committees, respectively. Id. § 30125(a)–(b).
While parties engage in independent spending for political speech, they do far more than
that. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154–85 (discussing party activities); Colo. Republican-I
v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608–13 (1996) (discussing spending limits). One example is
coordinated spending for political speech, which counts as an indirect contribution. See
FEC v. Colo. Republican-II, 533 U.S. 431, 437–40 (2001); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46–47,
78 (1976).
Section 30125(d) bans some donations to Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c) and
527 organizations. 52 U.S.C. § 30125(d). Except as the law forbids, Section 501(c) and 527
organizations may contribute directly and indirectly to candidates and political parties.
E.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (2012) (banning corporate and union contributions to federal
political committees).
Section 30125(e) addresses how federal candidates, federal officeholders, their agents,
and organizations they establish, finance, maintain or control, and raise money. 52 U.S.C.
§ 30125(e). In particular, 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(4)(B) refers to money they raise for activity in
52 U.S.C. § 30101(20)(A)(i) and 30101(20)(A)(ii). Such solicitations can be for speech other
than independent spending for political speech. 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e).
Section 30125(f) addresses particular speech by state and local candidates. Id.
§ 30125(f).
134
See, e.g., WRTL-I, 546 U.S. at 411–12 (holding that “[i]n upholding § 203 against a facial
challenge, we did not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges”).
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expenditures, for the then-candidate for justice.135 The judicial-recusal
standard does not inquire after corruption or its appearance as in Citizens
United.136 Instead, the threshold is lower.137 As Justice Anthony
Kennedy, Caperton’s author, explains in Citizens United, Caperton is
different from Citizens United.138
Nor do appellate opinions such a Cao v. FEC support limiting
contributions for independent spending—Cao is about “in-kind and
direct contributions” by parties to candidates, not contributions for
independent spending.139
I.

Conclusion on Contributions for Independent Spending

Advocates of limiting contributions for independent spending can
assign any label they please—such as “crabbed view of corruption”—to
post-Citizens United law, but that does not change the law.140 These labels
are not legal argument, nor are they helpful.141 Contributions for
independent spending for political speech do not cause quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance, so government may not limit such
contributions from persons other than foreign nationals.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 872–73 (2009).
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356–61 (2010).
137
See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (noting that “[t]he Court asks not whether the judge is
actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be
neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’”).
138
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. Citizens United states:
Caperton held that a judge was required to recuse himself “when a
person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising
funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent.” The remedy of recusal was based on a
litigant’s due[-]process right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge.
Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must be
recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.
Id. (citations omitted).
139
In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011).
140
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003) (quoted in Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(lamenting Citizens United while quoting the same text from McConnell); Emily’s List v.
FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J., concurring) (lamenting McConnell preCitizens United).
141
See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights &
Fight for Equality by any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1639 (2014) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (stating that “[p]eople can disagree in good faith on this issue, but it
similarly does more harm than good to question the openness and candor of those on
either side of the debate”).
135
136
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III. LIMITS ON DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES
A. McCutcheon’s Impact on Contribution Limit Review
On April 2, 2014, in a five-to-four decision, the United States
Supreme Court struck down federal aggregate contribution limits to
These limits supplemented base
candidates or committees.142
contribution limits on how much could be given to each candidate or
committee.143 So although plaintiff Shaun McCutcheon desired to
contribute the maximum legal amount to numerous federal candidates
and non-candidate political committees, he was restricted by
overarching aggregate limits.144 A plurality of the Court found that
those aggregate limits served neither a corruption nor an anticircumvention interest.145 And even if the anti-circumvention interest
were served, the Court found that the limits were mismatched to that
interest, particularly because more reasonable alternatives exist.146
While directed towards aggregate contribution limits, the
McCutcheon decision redefines and clarifies the legal principles
governing contribution limit challenges in several key ways. First, the
decision makes clear that contributions are not simply an associational
right but political expression in their own right:
[T]he First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right
to participate in the public debate through political
expression and political association. . . . When an
individual contributes money to a candidate, he
exercises both of those rights: [t]he contribution “serves
as a general expression of support for the candidate and
his views” and “serves to affiliate a person with a
candidate.”147
Second, the decision expressly identified which state interests are
cognizable and which are not.
The government cannot adopt
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440, 1462, 1465 (2014).
Id. at 1442.
144
Id. at 1443.
145
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, reasoning that Buckley v. Valeo’s distinction
between independent expenditures and contributions were “two sides of the same First
Amendment coin,” and so Buckley’s less rigorous scrutiny for contribution limits—which
the plurality used in reaching its result—ought to be overturned. Id. at 1464 (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241 (1976), Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Id. at 1454–56.
146
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–59.
147
Id. at 1448 (citations omitted).
142
143
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contribution limits as a means of “reduc[ing] the amount of money in
politics,” of “restrict[ing] the political participation of some in order to
enhance the relative influence of others,” or of preventing “general
gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his
allies, or the political access such support may afford.”148 It cannot
attempt to “level the playing field,” “level electoral opportunities,” or
“equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates.”149 Nor may the
government “seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.”150
Not only are efforts to “‘restrict the speech of some elements of our
society to enhance the relative voices of others . . . wholly foreign to the
First Amendment[,]’” these objectives “impermissibly inject the
Government ‘into the debate over who should govern’ . . . the last people
[who should] help decide who should govern.”151 Such limits only
penalize “an individual for ‘robustly exercising’ his First Amendment
rights.”152
The only cognizable justification for contribution limits is preventing
quid pro quo corruption, with quid pro quo corruption now meaning only
“a direct exchange of an official act for money,” or “dollars for political
favors,” “an act akin to bribery.”153 The government “may permissibly
seek to rein in ‘large contributions [that] are given to secure a political
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.’”154 And it may
“limit ‘the appearance of corruption’”—that is, “‘public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions’ to particular candidates.”155 The plurality cautioned,
however, that “[s]pending large sums of money in connection with
elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo
corruption.”156 Nor do large sums spent to garner influence or access to
elected officials or political parties.157 “[T]he risk of corruption arises
when an individual makes large contributions to the candidate or
officeholder himself.”158
Id. at 1441.
Id. at 1450.
150
Id. at 1451 (emphasis added) (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).
151
Id. at 1450 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct.
at 1441–42 (citing Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2826 (2011)).
152
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449.
153
Id. at 1441; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154
Id. at 1450 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26).
155
Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27).
156
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450.
157
Id. at 1451.
158
Id. at 1460.
148
149
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The government may also justify contribution limits “by
demonstrating that they prevent circumvention” of laws designed to
prevent quid pro quo corruption.159 Contribution limits targeting quid pro
quo corruption through circumvention must still, however, guard
“against an individual’s funneling [of] ‘massive amounts of money to a
particular candidate.’”160
Third, the decision allocates the burden of proof in reviewing
contribution limits: “[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the
Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its
actions.”161 This burden applies both to proof of a cognizable interest, as
well to prove the limits are closely drawn.162 And whether it offers proof
of quid pro quo corruption, proof of circumvention, or proof the limits are
closely drawn, the government’s evidence cannot be speculative, “mere
conjecture,” “highly implausible,” irrational, premised on illegal
conduct, largely inapplicable, or “divorced from reality.”163
Fourth, the decision discards the argument that contributions from
organizations corrupt more than those from individuals: “there is not
the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when money
flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor
contributes to a candidate directly.”164 An individual cedes control over
his contribution when he gives to an independent actor, and “if the
funds are subsequently rerouted to a particular candidate, such actions
occur[] at the initial recipient’s discretion—not the donor’s.”165 This
creates an ever-growing chain of attribution, with credit “shared among
the various actors along the way.”166 Such contributions are thus diluted
by all the other contributions from others to the same independent
actors.167
Last, the decision shows the analysis required under the “closely
drawn test” to assess whether contribution limits were adequately
Id. at 1439.
Id. at 1460 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38); see supra text accompanying note 32
(discussing anti-circumvention as a state interest).
161
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529
U.S. 803, 816 (2000)).
162
See id. at 1452–53 (reasoning that Congress’s selection of a $5200 base limit suggests
that a contribution of that amount or less would not create a cognizable risk of corruption).
163
Id. at 1452–56 (explaining that in the Buckley decision, the fear of an individual
contributing substantial amounts of money to one candidate was far too speculative).
164
Id. at 1452.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (explaining that any credit has to be shared with all
of the various actors along the line, which consequently makes the chain of attribution
much longer).
159
160
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tailored.168 The Court evaluated whether “a substantial mismatch
[existed] between the Government’s stated objective and the means
selected to achieve it,” whether there was a “reasonable fit” to serve that
objective.169 This reasonable fit, while “not necessarily the least
restrictive means,” must still be “a means narrowly tailored to achieve
the desired objective.”170 The availability of better, more reasonable
alternatives belie a “closely drawn” claim.171 The closely drawn test is
applied especially rigorously where a limit is part of “prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis” regulation, that is, layers of regulation ostensibly designed
to address the same anti-corruption interest.172
B. McCutcheon’s Effect on Candidate Contribution Limits Analysis
Because of McCutcheon, key circuit court decisions that previously
upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates are no longer legally
sound. In the Ninth Circuit’s Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, issued in
2003, the court upheld both base contribution limits on individuals and
PACs as well as aggregate limits on PACs.173 Its rationale for doing so
conflicts with McCutcheon.
Significantly, the Eddleman decision focuses on the state’s interest in
“preventing undue influence.”174 Relying on Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Gov’t PAC, Eddleman contends that a state’s interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption is not confined to instances of
bribery of public officials, but extends “to the broader threat from
politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”175 The
court in Eddleman considered as evidence of this threat the testimony of a
Montana legislator that “special interests funnel more money into
campaigns when particular issues approach a vote ‘because it gets
results’,” citing a letter from a state senator to his colleagues urging a
Id. at 1446.
See id. at 1456 (stating that the Court requires a fit that is reasonable when not
applying strict scrutiny).
170
Id. at 1456–57 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171
See id. at 1458 (discussing the many alternatives Congress can use to adhere to the
government’s anticircumvention interest) (citation omitted).
172
See id. (analyzing the closely drawn test).
173
Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the
district court’s holding that Montana’s base and aggregate contribution limits are
constitutional and do not violate the First Amendment).
174
Id. at 1096, 1099 (Teilborg, J., dissenting) (“the State has chosen to enact an aggregate
PAC contribution limit to prevent a candidate from being overly influenced by special
interests generally”).
175
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000); Eddleman, 343 F.3d at
1092 (quoting Shrink Missouri PAC, 528 U.S. at 389) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168
169
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favorable vote on a bill because it would ensure that a higher proportion
of PAC money would flow to the Republican party, and citing a poll
showing that “69% of Montanans [suspect] that elected officials give
special treatment to individuals and businesses that make large
contributions”—evidence that shows not bribery but influence and
access.176
Under McCutcheon, these concerns do not rise to the level of a
cognizable state interest.177 Corruption is a cognizable interest only
when defined as quid pro quo corruption, that is, “a direct exchange of an
official act for money,” “dollars for political favors,” or “akin to
bribery.”178 So the Eddleman’s state interest analysis—and the Shrink’s
analysis on which it relies—are no longer valid.179
Additionally, as to PAC contribution limits both base and aggregate,
the Eddleman court held that undue influence is bolstered by the fact that
the “danger of corruption in the political system is greater with respect
to PAC contributions than it is for individuals.”180 McCutcheon rejects
this contention, observing that “there is not the same risk of quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent
actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate
directly.”181 Because PACs, like political parties, are independent from
individual donors, there is less danger of corruption from individuals
through PAC contributions.
After establishing an “undue influence” interest, the Eddleman court
determined that the focus of base contribution limits’ tailoring analysis is
“as much on those aspects of associational freedom unaffected by the
law as the limitations that are imposed,” justifying this approach with
the Shrink presumption that “the dollar amounts employed to prevent
corruption should be upheld unless they are ‘so radical in effect as to

176
Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1093 (describing an incident in 1981 where a Republican state
senator sent a letter persuading his colleagues to vote to pass a bill allowing variable
annual annuities to secure a substantial portion of PAC contributions for the Republican
party).
177
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360
(2010)) (explaining that “the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the
appearance of quid pro quo corruption” and that “the Government may not seek to limit the
appearance of mere influence or access”).
178
Id. at 1441; id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
179
Indeed, concerns about a politician being “too compliant” to large contributors speaks
to undue influence concerns, not quid pro quo corruption concerns. Id. at 1469 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1099 (Teilborg, J., dissenting) (“having a limit on
the amount an individual PAC may contribute to a candidate sufficiently
prevents . . . ‘unfair influence’ over a candidate”).
180
Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted).
181
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.
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render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s
voice beyond the level of notice, and render contributions pointless.’”182
So the Eddleman analysis offset burdens on association with
opportunities that remained unaffected, finding that the PAC aggregate
limits before it “in no way prevents PACs from affiliating with their
chosen candidates in ways other than direct contributions. . . .”183
This analysis fails under McCutcheon for two reasons. First, it
focuses tailoring solely on the associational aspect that the contribution
limits affect.184 But as McCutcheon states, when an individual contributes
money to a candidate, he exercises both an expressive as well as an
associational right.185 And second, while theoretically, supporters can
associate and express themselves in numerous ways other than
contributing, as a practical matter, many supporters, whether
individuals or groups, do not have available to them a panoply of
alternative, effective means to support all of their preferred candidates or
causes.186 Eddleman considered no evidence that such alternatives were
plausible and practical.
Indeed, Eddleman fails to even consider, much less assess, less
restrictive alternatives for fulfilling the state’s interests in averting actual
As McCutcheon
or apparent corruption, such as disclosure.187
unequivocally establishes, the government must show that the
contribution limits are the more reasonable fit.188 Eddleman considered
no such evidence.
Finally, Eddleman’s tailoring analysis nowhere considers the
prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis aspect of Montana’s contribution limit
scheme.189 McCutcheon expresses concern about layering aggregate
contribution limits on top of base limits and mandates use of a
particularly rigorous closely drawn test in such a context:
a
“‘prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis
approach’
requires . . . particular[]
182
Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
397 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (explaining that a donor has expressive and
associational rights that are denied by the base limits).
186
See id. at 1449 (describing how the numerous other ways of contributing to a political
party is unrealistic).
187
See id. at 1460 (“disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative . . . [and] offers
much more robust protections against corruption”).
188
See id. at 1456 (“[e]ven when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require a
fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single
best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served . . . ” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
189
Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094.
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diligen[ce] in scrutinizing the law’s fit.”190 But Eddleman does not
analyze the fit of the PAC aggregate limits before it as McCutcheon
requires.191 McCutcheon calls Eddleman into serious doubt.
The same can be said of the 2011 Second Circuit decision Ognibene v.
Parkes.192 It too considered contribution limits: one that is a direct,
“doing business” limit, and two that are bans—a matching fund ban and
a business entity ban. New York City’s regulations:
[R]estrict[] contributions from [] individuals and entities
who have business dealings with the City . . . [and]
lower[] these donors’ contribution limits approximately
twelve-fold, to $400 (from the generally-applicable level
of $[4950]) for three City-wide offices; to $320 (from
$[3850]) for Borough offices; and to $250 (from $[2750])
for City Council.
The law also makes these
contributions ineligible for public matching, and extends
the ban on corporate contributions to LLCs, LLPs, and
partnerships.193
As in Eddleman, the rationale and outcome of Ognibene would be much
different under McCutcheon.
First, as in Eddleman, the state interest is invalid. The Second Circuit
held that while “mere influence or access to elected officials is
insufficient . . . improper or undue influence presumably still qualifies as a
form of corruption.”194 Such “[i]mproper or undue influences includes
both traditional quid pro quo and more discreet exchanges of money for
favorable outcomes.”195 Additionally, the Second Circuit reasoned that:
[B]ecause the scope of quid pro quo corruption can never
be reliably ascertained, the legislature may regulate
certain indicators of such corruption or its appearance,
such as when donors make large contributions because
they have business with the City, hope to do business

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458.
See id. (stating that the Court “cannot conclude that the sweeping aggregate limits are
appropriately tailored to guard against any contributions that might implicate the
[g]overnment’s anticircumvention interest”).
192
Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 185, 193–94 (2d Cir. 2012).
193
Id. at 179–80 (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3–703(1)(l); 3–703(1-a); 3–719(2)(b)).
194
Id. at 186.
195
Id. at 187.
190
191
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with the City, or are expending money on behalf of
others who do business with the City.196
Whether the initial limits have been successful and make the lower
limits unnecessary, said the Second Circuit, “is a matter of policy better
suited for the legislature.”197 So it held that all three limits—the doing
business contribution limits, the matching fund ban, and the business
entity ban—served this interest.198
Under McCutcheon, averting or curbing influence—undue or
otherwise—is not a recognized interest.199 Nor is “regulat[ing] certain
indicators of [] corruption or its appearance” because “the scope of quid
pro quo corruption can never be reliably ascertained.”200 Moreover,
McCutcheon states that though ‘[t]he line between quid pro quo corruption
and general influence may seem vague at times, . . . the distinction must
be respected to safeguard basic First Amendment rights,” with the line
“err[ing] on the side of protecting political speech rather than
suppressing it.”201 Not only did the Second Circuit accept what
McCutcheon has since invalidated as a state interest, it extended the
government too much deference, erring on the side of unproved
corruption than on that of protected speech.202

Id.
Id. at 189.
198
The evidence on which the court relied suggests that the real objective of the “doing
business” contribution limits and the matching fund ban was to level the playing field by
offsetting perceived access with lower contribution receipts. In a report on which the
district court relied, the City Council states:
While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with contributions from
those doing business with the City, the ability of such individuals to
contribute could create a perception, regardless of whether such
perception is accurate, that such individuals have a higher level of
access to the City's elected officials. It is important to eradicate this
perception and reduce the appearance of undue influence associated
with contributions from individuals doing business with the City.
Ognibene v. Parkes, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). But see McCutcheon v. FEC,
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450–51 (2014) (stating that such interests are improper).
199
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450–51 (stating that averting or curbing influence is not
a recognized interest).
200
Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 187.
201
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (quoting FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449,
457 (2007)).
202
See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (“The line between quid pro quo corruption and
general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order
to safeguard basic First Amendment rights”); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
361 (2010) (“When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due
deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy . . .”).
196
197
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The Second Circuit’s tailoring analysis is also inadequate under
McCutcheon. All three contribution regulations are what McCutcheon
refers to as “prophylaxis-on-prophylaxis” regulations.203 Base limits
already exist establishing a contribution baseline at which the City has
presumably determined that its officials are not corrupted. So to justify
the lower limits and bans for business-dealing donors and business
entities, their “fit” is subject to especially rigorous review, something the
Second Circuit failed to do.204
Under such review, the “doing business” limits would fail because
the City’s evidence nowhere demonstrated that while a $4951
contribution in a city-wide campaign can bribe or appear to bribe a
candidate, anything larger than $400 from a business-dealing donor
results in bribery or would appear to be a bribe. The matching fund ban
would fail because the City nowhere demonstrated that matching funds
triggered by a contribution from someone doing business with the City
will corrupt a candidate any more than funds triggered at the same rate
by any other contributor. And the business-entity ban would fail
because the City offered no evidence demonstrating that even $1 of
corporate contributions would corrupt while contributions as high as
$4950 from the corporate owners’ spouses, domestic partners,
employees, and children would not. This is the type of evidence
required under McCutcheon. Lacking such evidence, the limits fail.
Additionally, the Second Circuit acknowledged that more narrow
regulations—bribery laws, earmarking bans, and disclosure—are more
narrow options.205 While the government does not need to choose the
least restrictive means of regulating contribution limits, it must show
that other alternatives are a less reasonable fit so as to avoid
unnecessarily burdening protected speech.206 The Court did not assess
why these were not more reasonable options as McCutcheon requires.207
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458.
See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 187 (deferring to the City on the proper way to regulate quid
pro quo corruption given its nebulous scope). Indeed, this reasonable fit analysis
underscores that the limits serve an interest in leveling the playing field and equalizing
voices. Id. at 200. The only credible reason a business donor’s contribution might have
more impact dollar-for-dollar than another, non-business dealing donor, is that she may
already have access to, and a relationship with, public officials—things beyond the
contribution itself—that can influence a public official. Id. at 187. Attempts to equalize
influence by offsetting access with contribution limits are expressly disapproved of in
McCutcheon. 134 S. Ct. at 1450–51.
205
See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 196 (explaining that it was for lack of these types of
regulations that the Second Circuit upheld the ban).
206
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–57.
207
Such regulations would afford a better, more reasonable fit. Since the only recognized
interest for regulating contribution limits is quid pro quo corruption, imposing uniform
203
204
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The existence of more reasonably fitting regulations is especially obvious
for the matching fund ban and the business entity ban, which extends to
spouses, domestic partners, employees, and children. The City allows
these individuals to contribute at the higher base amount. If the City
were genuinely concerned about circumvention, the most immediate
potential avenue of circumventing would be through family and
employee contributions. Yet the City leaves the base limits alone for
both family and employees, instead banning matching funds and
business entity contributions. The City’s failure to address the most
obvious source of potential circumvention suggests the bans are not a
reasonable fit, and indeed, that anti-circumvention interests are not the
true impetus for them. As with Eddleman, McCutcheon calls Ognibene into
serious doubt.
IV. CONCLUSION
McCutcheon not only substantially changes, but makes more rigorous
the analysis used in challenges to regulations of contributions for
independent spending and of direct contributions to candidates. Both
types of contribution limits are likely unconstitutional under its
framework.

limits with disclosure requirements and a bribery prohibition with strict penalties for
incumbents would more reasonably address quid pro quo corruption without unduly
restricting protected expression and association.
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